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Public sector organizations literature has 
addressed the influence of AI on decision-making 
process, looking mainly at rationalization and 
efficiency. However, recent adoptions of AI have been 
challenged because of their discriminatory nature. As 
a result, questions emerged on the accountability of AI 
supported decision-making processes in the public 
sector. This research sheds light on how AI transforms 
decision-making processes in the public sector and 
hence on their accountability. The paper illustrates 
that AI adoptions lead to the emergency of techno-
legal entanglements – assemblages – which might 
impact upon AI accountability. Building on the 
findings of some of the most controversial and 
discussed cases of AI adoption in the public sector – 
COMPAS in the US and UKVI in the UK – the paper 
makes the case for a new approach to AI supported 
public sector decision-making accountability. 
1. Introduction  
Public sector organizations adopt Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) systems to improve the efficiency of 
the provision of public services [1]. The Public 
Administration (PA) has deployed AI tools in order to 
reach better informed and more rapid decision-making 
in multiple service domains: from policing to home 
office, from criminal justice to healthcare. AI in fact 
formalises decision-making processes rationalising 
the decision-making tree in the algorithmic code. 
Hence, AI reduces administrative discretionary [2] 
explicating formal and informal rules into the script of 
the technology [3]. Accordingly, AI encodes into the 
scripts of the algorithm formal and informal 
organisation processes which create a new 
technological accountability which supersedes formal 
and informal mechanisms of accountability. Decisions 
taken by AI algorithms follow the logic designed into 
the script of the technology, which imposes a 
technological order [4] that transcends rational (the 
logic of consequence) and institutional (logic of 
appropriateness) decision-making logics [5]. In the 
public sector, these AI adoptions are mostly studied 
looking at the legal and normative transformations 
they trigger, however the impacts these 
transformations have on the accountability of the 
action of the PA is mostly undermined. To shed light 
on this crucial aspect related to the adoption of AI in 
the public sector the paper addresses the following 
research question: 
RQ: what is the accountability of AI supported 
decision-making process in the public sector? 
To answer this question the paper builds on the 
theory of assemblages [6]. The theory helps to unfold 
the intertwined nature of AI systems and organization 
and legal actions which ultimately determine the 
accountability of the actions of public sector 
organizations. 
2. Background  
Artificial Intelligence adoptions in the public 
sector are not equally researched as those in the private 
sector [7]. However, scholars have investigated the 
topic and found that AI systems can benefit public 
service provision: Wirtz et al. [8] offer a 
comprehensive review of the most recent researches in 
this domain.  
A robust stream of literature accounts for how AI 
reduces the red tape and improves the efficiency of the 
administrative procedures [9]. AI favours cost savings 
and better resource allocation [10]. AI systems have 
been successfully adopted in different domains of the 
public sector to support service provisions and to 
rationalise administrative tasks [1, 11]. Despite these 
positive and encouraging outcomes, obstacles and 
challenges are also identified as direct consequence of 
AI adoptions in public sector. Overall, scholars 
accounted for potential problems related to AI 
governance [12]; from AI ethical standards [13]; to 
AI’s socially acceptance and trust [14]. Despite the 
attention given to the relationships between ICT and 
the formalisation of public organisation practices and 
processes in literature [15, 16], the how AI impacts 





these formalisations and the associated decision-
making processes has not been extensively researched 
yet. In this paper we first discuss how AI algorithms 
operate and their impact on decisions taken in the PA. 
Hence, we question their impacts on PA decision-
making accountability. Recent publications have 
addressed the problem of AI accountability looking at 
auditing [17] and algorithmic explainability [18]. 
While insightful, these contributions do not help 
shedding light on why AI might challenge the 
accountability of public sector decision-making 
processes. 
Given the space limits imposed by this submission, 
we cannot enter in an in-depth discussion of the 
complex concept of accountability. For the research 
purpose, we rely on Bovens’ [19] definition of 
accountability as a “mechanism that involves an 
obligation to explain and justify an actor conduct” to 
those who can scrutinize and judge the actor’s conduct 
and order sanctions. Formal and informal mechanisms 
of accountability can be identified [19]. Given the 
focus (and the space limitations) of this research, and 
the fact that informal mechanisms of accountability do 
not fully capture the formalisations imposed by ICT 
systems [20], we will focus on formal mechanisms of 
accountability.  Hence, we investigate and question the 
accountability of the techno-legal mechanisms that 
result from the negotiation between formal, legal 
mechanisms of accountability with AI systems. 
The increased concerns with regards to the 
discriminating effects of PA decisions mediated by AI 
systems [1] raises the call to question AI 
accountability i.e. to explain and justify how AI 
impacts PA decisions. The lack of accountability of AI 
decision-making systems have raised concerns on the 
use of AI to support public sector service delivery [21]. 
These concerns mainly deal with ethical and legal 
aspects [22].  
The search for AI accountability in this context has 
been framed as a human/technology control dilemma 
[8]: humans are not accountable since they are not in 
full control of AI [23]; or humans are accountable for 
the technology despite their control over AI [24]. 
Alternatively, many scholars have focused on 
transparency as crucial determinant of AI 
accountability. Hence, scholars focus on technological 
transparency, i.e. the need to open the “black box” 
involving decision-making based on AI systems [25], 
others call for the introduction of designers’ 
“explanation” as reliable practice to improve the 
algorithmic transparency [18, 26].  
Building on this background, this paper aims to 
make a step further to explain and justify, hence 
question the accountability of decision-making 
processes supported by AI in the public sector. We 
argue that to fully unpack the accountability of AI-
based decision-making process, it is important to shed 
light on the complex effects of AI systems on the 
decision-making logics followed by public sector 
organisations. This research shows that technology is 
not a neutral tool of transformation: rather, technology 
reflects but also transcend decision-making drivers of 
the context where it is deployed [27]. Accordingly, AI 
systems adopted to support decision-making processes 
in the PA generate organizational, legal, and 
institutional, transformations that deeply impact on the 
logics driving public decision-making and hence on 
services production and delivery[6, 28]. 
3. How technology shapes and transforms 
practices: functional simplification and 
closure  
The literature that analyses how technology 
engrains and transforms social and institutional 
practices into the code of technology [29, 30] is very 
valuable to understand and depict how the socio-
institutional transformations engendered by AI 
adoptions in the public sector impact on the 
accountability of the decision-making processes. This 
literature does not specifically study AI but offers an 
in-depth account of how information and 
communication technology (ICT) works and impacts 
on organization practices, which very well applies to 
AI. Rooted in Luhmann’s [31] work on technology, 
this literature challenges the widespread assumption 
that understanding ICT is a matter of means and ends 
[29], and sheds light on the specific trajectories by 
which ICT transforms existing relations in the contexts 
of its application.  
ICT has properties that structure the causal 
connections between the organizational practices, 
processes and activities it mediates [29, 31]. ICT re-
maps the organizational procedures and practices it 
mediates [31] in the predefined logical sequences of 
actions [32] unique of the code that structures the 
functioning of each specific software application. By 
so doing, ICT constructs into the software 
functionalities sets of structured sequences and 
interdependences that standardise the execution of 
organizational procedures and processes. The effect is 
that ICT imposes regulatory frameworks that frame 
organizational activities, providing stable and 
standardized means of interaction and coordination 
[29]. These regulatory frameworks are shaped into the 
technical functionalities of the systems. Work 
sequences and flows are embedded into the 
technological functions, reducing the procedural 
complexity of the work in causal or instrumental 
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relations that are standardized and stabilized in the 
technical scripts. This happens as the result of the 
processes of functional simplification and closure [33, 
29]. These are the processes by which ICT engrains 
organization’s activities, procedures, or operations 
into its codes. The code that governs the functions of 
an ICT system has specific functional requirements 
that only allow to design activities, processes, or 
operations to be executed in specific ways [29].  
Whenever a public administration designs and deploys 
an ICT solution in an organizational context, the 
normative, institutional, and legal logics governing the 
action of the organization have to be re-written into the 
code of the ICT. In other words, as explained by 
Lanzara [6], institutional codes which regulate the 
functioning of an existing organization are reframed to 
accommodate the unique code of the chosen ICT 
system. Moreover, the complexity of all the 
normative, legal, behavioural and social values that 
shape the causal connections that determine how an 
organization works cannot be fully accommodated in 
the design of an ICT solution. It is not possible to 
rewrite and translate all these causal connections into 
the scripts of ICT systems. These casual connections 
have to be reduced – or, functionally simplified: the 
language of automation needs to enclose the 
composite of procedures, actions and relations in 
standardized and replicable logical sequences [29] 
which govern the function of the ICT system. In order 
to successfully replicate the practices reduced into the 
code of the ICT, the causal connections already 
simplified need to be functionally closed. That is, the 
reduction of complexity needs to be isolated from the 
external context, in order to avoid possible 
interference from social actors and execution. While 
functional simplification is obtained through the 
reconstruction of existing relations in instrumental set 
of actions [29], functional closure refers to the 
application of a “protective cocoon” which safeguards 
the causal connections reduced and allows their 
replicability over time [29, p.192].  
Functional simplification and closure guarantee 
that ICT reproduces its standards and executes its 
functions consistently in different contexts of 
application. Though, the normative, legal, behavioural 
and social values that are functionally simplified and 
closed in the ICT change their features for ever. They 
lose their original characteristics because functional 
simplification and closure rewrite them in new, 
stabilised sequences of causal interdependences that 
make them very difficult to be changed [29]. These 
sequences of causal interdependences, structured in 
the code of the ICT, have the ability and the power to 
redesign organizational processes and procedures. 
Hence, ICT creates new paths of interdependences that 
produce new sets of regulations in the contexts of their 
application [30]. Therefore, every time ICT systems 
are deployed to support decision-making processes, 
they replicate and reproduce the functionally 
simplified and closed patterns over time [30]. The 
more the decision-making processes are digitised, the 
more they get standardised into stable causal and 
instrumental relations [33], which make them very 
difficult to modify. By so doing, ICT becomes a 
regulative regime [34]: it incorporates and reproduces 
practices and actions in its codes, which carry the 
power and the authority to regulate how organization’s 
decision-making processes are structured. 
4. The creation of assemblages  
Functional simplification and closure describe the 
way by which institutional bodies and norms are 
transformed (and reduced) in ICT standard. Therefore, 
the deployment of ICT in public sector organizations 
produces relevant institutional transformations beyond 
[6, 30] the impact on rationalisation and effectiveness.  
In order to better account for the different impacts 
of ICT on public sector decision-making processes, it 
is valuable to consider that to deploy ICTs in complex 
organizations means to juxtapose a single regulative 
regime – the one carried by ICT – with other regulative 
regimes such as normative, legal, institutional and 
cultural, that constrain how the organization take 
decisions [34]. ICT adoptions occur either in 
coordination or collision with other regulative 
regimes, such as those imposed by normative 
prescriptions, legal codes, bureaucratic logics, cultural 
and social systems of values. However, once ICT is 
deployed it has to negotiate with the other regulative 
regimes – normative, legal, institutional and cultural – 
that already regulate how the organization takes 
decisions. The impact of ICT on organization 
decision-making is therefore the outcome of the 
negotiation of the regulative regime carried by ICT 
with others which already shape organization 
decision-making processes. This negotiation is 
complex and time-consuming, but it is important to 
fully appreciate how ICT impacts and transforms 
public sector organizations and the way in which these 
organizations take decisions. 
In order to adequately assess how the negotiations 
between the regulative regime of ICT and the other 
regulative regimes occur, we have to clearly identify 
the mechanisms which shape these negotiations. 
Contini and Cordella [35] observe that the different 
regulative regimes do not mix or simply overlap: they 
maintain a degree of autonomy when they encounter 
in a specific context.  
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To better understand how different regimes 
negotiate the way in which the organizations take 
decisions we have to investigate how the different 
configurations carried by the regimes overlap, 
interconnect, clash or intertwine. To explain these 
negotiations, Lanzara [6] provides the useful concept 
of “assemblages”. Assemblages are the product of 
multiple determinations that are not reducible to a 
single logic: functional linkages and other public 
sector practices and actions equally count in working 
out new institutional ecology. According to Lanzara 
[6], an assemblage is a particular institutional 
configuration, generated by the negotiation of ICT 
with existing normative, legal, institutional and 
cultural arrangements. Every time an ICT is deployed 
in a public sector organization with the aim to achieve 
a specific objective, it engages with existing 
normative, legal, institutional and cultural 
arrangements which already govern how the 
organization works. The arrangements are regulated 
by norms, laws and behaviours which structure the 
administrative activity and define boundaries of 
operations. Once ICT is deployed within a specific 
context, it doesn’t impact on an unregulated context. 
ICT layers on existing regimes which already regulate 
the organization decision-making processes [6]. 
The negotiation among the different regimes 
produces techno-legal-institutional assemblages that 
are by nature loosely structures [6]. The compatibility 
of the different regimes is limited and complicated, 
because the different regimes carry different logics, 
patterns and systems of values [6, 32]. The 
negotiations among these regimes involve multiple 
dimensions and trajectories that are difficult to 
intergrade and that are not necessarily compatible [6]. 
This further explains why the adoptions of ICTs in the 
public sector are challenging, difficult to be managed, 
and why the outcomes of the transformations they 
facilitate are also difficult to predict and control [36].  
To unfold the impacts of AI on public sector 
decision-making process, and on the production and 
delivery of public services, is therefore important to 
analyse (a) how AI functionally simplifies and closes 
organization practices and (b) how the negotiation 
between the regulative regime carried by AI and those 
already present in the public organization unfolds. 
5. AI: functional simplification and 
closure 
Artificial intelligence provides new means to 
analyse and process information [37] which transform 
the way in which public sector organizations produce 
and provide services [8, 1]. Artificial intelligence 
relies on algorithmic data processing. Algorithms 
structure problem solving in formalised and pre-
defined rules to be implemented in step by step 
computational operations [38]. The use of AI in public 
sector organizations is therefore associated with 
transformations in data processing that follow the 
predefined rules formalised in step by step 
computational operations which constitute the kernel 
of the algorithmic functions at the core of the AI 
system. The formalisation of organization processes 
offers univocal means to execute them, which 
facilitates and leads the automations of organization 
decision-making processes. The structured rules that 
predefine how data processing is executed allow to 
delegate the execution of organization decisions to the 
AI system – i.e. this result in the automation of 
organization processes. The automation of 
organization processes redefines fundamental 
organization practices, delegating the execution of 
tasks that were previously under the responsibility of 
organization actors, to the AI algorithms [39]. The 
automation of organization tasks brought by the 
adoption of AI systems also reshapes the distribution 
of control and authority within and among 
organization functions. The responsibility and 
accountability of organization tasks are not any more 
exclusively under the traditional organizations’ 
functions and people in charge of it, but rather in the 
structure of the algorithm that now executes these 
tasks [7]. The rules that govern the fractioning of the 
algorithms at the core of the AI system captivate 
organization decision-making processes. These rules 
delegate organizations’ decision responsibilities and 
accountability [40] to technological artefacts that 
enforce pattern of action that are unique, and not 
necessarily compatible with the contextual normative, 
administrative and legal governing logics. 
6. AI: the assemblage 
AI redesigns organizations’ decision-making rules 
and regulations into the functional sequences and 
interdependences proper of the algorithm. By doing 
so, it follows the design principle specific of the 
chosen technology, which can diverge from the 
trajectory proper of the specific organization’s 
decision-making rules and regulations [7, 6]. The 
tension that emerges between the different decision-
making logics governing the functioning of the AI 
algorithms and of the organization rules and 
regulations has implications that are unique given the 
normative and regulatory nature of public sector 
organizations. The formalisation of the computational 
mechanisms that govern the decision-making logic of 
the AI transforms how the public administration takes 
decisions, which has impacts on how public services 
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are produced and provided. Public sector 
organizations have in fact a unique and very specific 
role: to enable policies that have been selected by 
elected leaders [41]. Public sector organizations 
offices should deploy these policies and thus deliver 
public services taking decisions that follow the 
specific prescriptions of the policies. To effectively 
follow these prescriptions, public sector decision-
making processes are organized and regulated on the 
base of well-defined normative and legal principles. 
Normative and legal principles provide a frame of 
action that guarantee effective and coherent decision-
making processes. Inscribing normative and legal 
values into the algorithmic formalizations of AI 
embeds intrinsic transformations in the decision-
making process of public sector organizations [3]. AI 
supported public sector decisions are defined by the 
structured predefined computational sequences proper 
of the algorithm, rather than by the normative and legal 
framework that govern the driving policy. Changing 
the process by which decisions are taken directly 
impacts the values the services generate [42]. 
Thus, the contribution of AI systems to public 
sector decision-making must be assessed considering 
the profound transformation they have on the 
organization’s procedures which govern the public 
sector decisions [43]. Whenever AI is adopted to 
sustain the decision-making process in the public 
sector, such transformations cannot be neglected to 
evaluate the outcomes of the decision-making and the 
consequences it has on public services. Accordingly, 
responsibility and accountability need to be 
adequately assessed and evaluated against this 
background.  
7. Methodology 
In order to illustrate our argument, we discuss two 
different examples of AI adoption in the public sector. 
We rely on the exploratory case study approach [44, 
45], using secondary data to understand how the 
algorithm at the core of the functioning of the AI 
negotiated its functioning with existing norms and 
laws governing the decision-making processes of the 
public administration. Exploratory case study 
approach is relevant to investigate contexts where 
there aren’t clear and single set of outcomes [44]. 
Through the selected cases, we aim to demonstrate that 
assemblages the emerge from AI adoptions call for a 
more nuanced understanding of the accountability of 
AI supported decision-making processes in the public 
sector. The examples under investigation rely on 
different AI adoptions to support decision-making 
processes in the public sector. Data collection includes 
secondary sources, mainly governmental documents, 
Parliamentary inquiries and media releases.  
For each case, data collection was undertaken in 
order to identify the main aspects of each single case 
study prior to the definition of the research question 
and hypotheses. Following the exploratory case study 
approach, the research question was formulated after 
the data were collected. On the basis of qualitative data 
analysis and collection, we were able to formulate our 
research interest, which has turned out to be an 
explanation of the impact the algorithm at the core of 
an AI system has on public sector decision-making 
accountability. Case study research is the most 
suitable approach for examining a phenomenon in its 
natural settings [45] and therefore the ideal vehicle for 
gaining a deeper understanding of the political, social, 
and technical factors that influence the accountability 
of AI supported decision-making processes in the 
public sector. 
8. Cases 
8.1 UKVI: Speedy boarding for white people? 
Since 2015, Home Office UK Visas and 
Immigration (UKVI) adopted an AI algorithm to 
sustain the decision-making process in the VISA 
applications service. The AI is used to streamline 
applications: it assigned a different colour to 
applications in relation to the applicant’s perceived 
risk rating. Green (low risk), Amber (medium risk) 
and Red (high risk). The AI predicts applicants’ risk 
on the basis of criteria such as nationality, ethnicity 
and age. Once assessed, applications are sent to 
caseworkers who further scrutinize the files and take 
the final decision. The AI system has a relevant impact 
on application processing time, and most important on 
the application’s chances to be approved: figures show 
that 96.36% of Green applications are accepted. In 
contrast, 81.08% of Amber applications and to 48.59% 
of Red applications are granted a VISA. In other 
words, less than one application out of two, if labelled 
Red, is granted a VISA [46]. The streamlining activity 
which assigned a Green, Amber or Red tag to the 
VISA applications has an impact on the organization 
of the whole decision-making process. The AI 
algorithm increased the productivity of the offices 
which led managers to set a daily target: officials are 
supposed to produce 75 decisions on Green, 35 on 
Amber and 25 on Red applications a day. The official 
report by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders 
and Immigrations defined these targets “challenging”, 
and the report emphasized that due to the high 
expected productivity, officials often relied on the AI 
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algorithm classification without a proper review on the 
decisions adopted [46].  
Civil society organizations, political forces and 
media shed a light on the algorithmic assessment 
process, claiming that it was perpetrating 
discriminations [47, 48]. Moreover, the report [46] 
revealed that “(a) tool that streams applications into 
Green, Amber, Red clusters carries the risk of 
‘confirmation bias’” (p.19). In other words, the system 
perpetrated existing biases related to nationality and 
hence ethnic. NGOs critics to the policy claimed that 
the outcome of this procedure was to create a 
“Fastlane” for white people, while BAME groups had 
less chances to see their applications approved [49].  
The case became subject of a parliamentary debate, 
where the UK government rejected accusations of 
racism, stating that system worked in line with 
prescriptions from the Equalities Act of 2010 [50]. In 
particular, the Home Office said that the algorithm is 
used exclusively to streamline applications, and that 
the final decision is taken by human officials. The 
purpose of the algorithm is to increase efficiency, 
saving time and cutting costs in the whole procedure. 
NGOs and opposition parties asked the government to 
disclose additional information related to the 
algorithm logic and functioning [48]. As of January 
2020, the government opposed to reveal the algorithm 
functioning details, such as the factors and the weights 
that determine the potential risk, or the updating of the 
algorithm itself [47]. Most recent data show that as of 
June 2019, UKVI rejected circa 400.000 applications 
out of 3.3 million received.  
8.2 State v Loomis  
In 2013, US citizen Eric Loomis was arrested in 
Wisconsin for driving a car involved in a former 
shooting case. Loomis pleaded guilty and was 
accordingly sentenced six years of detention. 
However, the sentence was not exclusively based on 
the judge’s evaluation of Loomis’ criminal record: a 
specific AI system produced a score which expressed 
Loomis’ potentiality to re-offend. The judge did not 
decide the sentence exclusively on the score, but they 
took into account the input produced by the AI system. 
The software, called COMPAS (Correctional offender 
management profiling for alternative sanctions), was 
based on an algorithm developed by business company 
Northpoint (now Equivant). The algorithm was able to 
predict the possibility to re-offend of a single citizen, 
on the basis of historical data and the answers to a 
questionnaire [51]. Loomis was assessed as an 
individual with high-risk to re-offend. What is relevant 
in this case is how the algorithm worked: it did not 
assess Loomis’ individual recidivist, rather, the 
algorithm elaborated the prediction on the basis of a 
comparison between Loomis’ data and a group of 
individuals with similar characteristics [52].  
Loomis challenged the sentence, claiming that the 
algorithm-based software was a clear violation of the 
right to due process [53]. In particular, Loomis’ case 
highlighted that (a) the algorithm was biased because 
it utilized information such as gender and race, (b) the 
algorithm used to predict Loomis’ recidivism by 
aggregating data on “recidivism risk for groups similar 
to the offender” [52], (c) that the use of COMPAS did 
not allow the defendant to access algorithm details. In 
other words, Loomis challenged the validity and 
accuracy of a system which sentenced citizens on the 
basis of an algorithm which could not be accessed by 
the defendant because it was protected by property 
rights and patents.  
The case was submitted to the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, which rejected the defendant claims, pointing 
out that (a) the risk assessment procedure was mostly 
correct, (b) the score was only one of the factors taken 
into consideration by the judge to formulate the 
sentence, (c) that Loomis could have access to the 
criteria used by COMPAS, but not on the algorithm 
mechanisms because they were covered by property 
rights [54]. However, the Court recommended a 
careful use of AI-based tools in sentencing: as Justice 
Roggensack’s concurring opinion demonstrated, 
judges are entitled to “consider” AI-based 
information, not to “rely” on them to formulate 
sentences [54].  
However, this collides with the US Supreme Court 
(i.e. Townsend v Burke) ruling which recognized that 
the due process right to a fair sentencing procedure 
included “the right to be sentenced on the basis of 
accurate information”. To this end, the Court in State 
v Skaff went on to underscore that a defendant must 
be given “means” to investigate and verify the 
information. This rises a fundamental question: how 
can the information produced by an AI system be 
investigated and verified? Hence, how can the AI be 
used to support courts’ rulings in the US? 
9. Discussion 
The selected examples offer the opportunity to 
analyze how AI shapes decision-making in the public 
sector. Despite their differences, the examples offer 
relevant insights on the way AI systems work and 
impact on decision-making processes underpinning 
public service provision.  
The cases show that the choice to implement an AI 
system to profile individuals on the basis of preset 
criteria designed in the algorithm produces inputs for 
the decision-making process that distort the outcome 
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of the decisions. These inputs are in fact not neutral: 
rather, they carry values that reflect the way in which 
AI systems functionally simplify and close the data. 
To match the needs of the algorithm, data about 
individuals (immigrants, asylum seekers, convicted 
felon) are fetched from different databases. In the case 
of UK from databases which contain information 
about known patterns in immigration abuses per age 
or nationality, etc. [46]; in the case of USA from police 
records, residential records, employment records, etc. 
[51]. The data sets fetched from the different databases 
are weighted to determine different risks associated 
with a profile. The weighting of the variable in the 
algorithm is defined by its design and the logical 
constraints of the chosen scripts at the core of the AI 
system [55]. Moreover, the AI profiling algorithm 
combines data owned by different agencies. These 
data are structured following the specific needs of each 
agency, regardless on whether the data belong to a 
convicted felon or and immigrant applying for a VISA. 
The logic which functionally simplified and closed the 
original data sets (which reflect the needs of the single 
agency for which the data were initially produced) is 
neglected when the data are weighted in the algorithm 
used to predict the level of risk the individual might 
create for the UK or US authorities. Moreover, the AI 
algorithm has functions which define unique data 
patterns which univocally determine how the data are 
combined and used [55]. The weighting of the 
different data and the definition of the patterns among 
data are also functionally simplified and closed data 
sets and data relations [56]. The weighting produces 
sets of causal connections that structure the outcomes 
of data interactions and processing and hence the 
profiling of the individual. 
For example, in COMPAS the Violent Recidivism 
Risk Scale is calculated as follows [57]: 
s=a(-w)+afirst(-w)+hviolencew+v edu w+h nc w, 
where s is the violent recidivism risk score, w  is a 
weight multiplier, a is current age, afirst is the age at 
first arrest, hviolence is the history of violence, vedu 
is vocation education level, and hnc is the history of 
noncompliance. The weight w is “determined by the 
strength of the item’s relationship to person offense 
recidivism” [57].  
Since the UK government refuses to give any 
details of the factors and relationships used to 
determine the risk it is not possible to provide a 
snapshot of how risk is calculated in UKVI case. 
However, we know that nationality, residence, 
academic qualification, language proficiency, 
financial situation, and age are among key criteria used 
by the algorithm to process applications.  
In both cases, data are de-contextualized from the 
relevant context, and the attributes which define an 
individual’s profile are abstracted from the context 
where they were produced and fragmented into 
independent data units – such as data cells in the 
database. As the examples show, the AI systems 
design in their code a set of new data linkages and 
relations which abstract individuals’ background and 
history to accommodate the logic of the algorithm. The 
AI algorithm constructs a unique profile of the 
individuals designed in the pattern of relationships that 
are constructed in the code of the algorithm which 
does not necessary reflect the real profile of the single 
person. In the UK or USA cases the risk identified by 
the algorithm is not the individual risk but the output 
of the data relationships constructed in the algorithm. 
The algorithm provides univocal ways to infer how 
different individual characteristics such as gender, 
age, nationality, combine to determine the social risk. 
The action of reducing causal connections is 
noteworthy necessary: without this action, the 
algorithm would not be able to work and produce the 
profiling. Also, to be effective, the set of causal 
connections must be isolated from the external context 
and made stable over time; hence it has to be 
functionally closed. Therefore, the process by which 
the AI profiling tool reconstructs the individual’s 
history is “cocooned” into the script of the algorithm. 
The procedure by which the AI processes the data 
stored in different databases is engrained in the script 
of the technology and cannot be modified if not 
following a formal complex technical procedure [58]. 
Profiling the individuals following the script of the 
algorithm changes the underline rules of the decision-
making process. As the selected cases show, the 
profiling follows the logic of the script and not 
necessarily those prescribed by the law or by the 
human-based procedure. Indeed, all projects were 
criticized because the profiling failed to adhere to the 
existing legal and administrative framework. When 
the algorithm functionally simplifies data relationships 
and data interdependences, it creates a new 
assemblage where the regulatory regime of the law is 
intertwined with regulatory regime of the technology. 
In other words, the decisions on VISA streamlining 
and on justice sentencing are negotiated between the 
regulatory regimes of the law and of the technology. 
The cases reveal that the outcome of the decision-
making process impacted by AI systems is different 
from the decision-making made by a human agent. In 
fact, the algorithm does not assess the data that belong 
to a single person in the light of individual 
characteristics and experiences; rather, it elaborates 
the outcome of a preset collective experience 
reconstructed according to technological standards. 
The results are indeed difficult to connect to the 
backgrounds of the individuals that are profiled. As a 
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consequence, the AI prediction of an individual to be 
harmful for the British or American society depends 
on the outputs of a profiling tool which works on the 
basis of a world which is reconstructed by functional 
simplification and closure made by the AI algorithm. 
Those who have to take the final decision will only 
have access to data that are decontextualized. Hence, 
they will not be able to assess the individual case. The 
human-mediated final decision-making process 
emerges as a new assemblage where decision makers 
take decisions using abstract data and data combined 
by the AI, instead of relying on individual data and 
circumstances as prescribed by legal norms and rules. 
Building on these findings, we aim to critically 
evaluate the concept of accountability when it relates 
to AI-based decision-making. The two selected cases 
show that the outcome of the decision-making process 
informed by AI has been formally challenged. The UK 
government rejected allegations of discriminating 
practices related to AI, and so did the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court. Interestingly, public institutions built 
their counter-argument on the basis of two 
considerations: (a) the algorithm had an ancillary role 
to the decision-making, and the public sector final 
decision relied on the human evaluation and (b) it was 
denied the right to access algorithms used to support 
decision-making.  
With respect to the first point, public institutions 
claimed that the decision-making process is made of 
two functions, automation and human evaluation. 
These two functions are not only separated, but reflect 
a hierarchical difference, because the human 
evaluation might overrule the information produced 
by AI. However, since the mechanisms that govern the 
functioning of the algorithm are not made public and 
transparent, the decision makers cannot know how and 
why a specific profiling is made. They have to take 
decisions using inputs different than those they had to 
rely upon had the AI system not been in place. The AI 
systems make recommendations using patterns that 
are not known to the decisions makers. In both cases, 
the decision makers have to judge and justify if they 
do not follow the AI recommendations, but not if they 
agree with it.  
For instance, in the UKVI case, public managers in 
charge of the final decisions on VISA are not expected 
to review a decision which was in line with the 
streaming rating [46]. In other words, Green 
applications approved, and Red applications rejected 
remained undisputed. When asked about possible 
allocating errors by the AI algorithm, public managers 
showed confidence on the accuracy of the algorithm 
streaming rating [46] even if they, as well as the 
public, are not given any access or explanation on how 
the algorithm works. Hence, the human decision 
makers’ actions are constrained by the functions 
executed by AI algorithm. Decision makers receive 
black boxed inputs to structure their decision-making. 
Even if the final decision is not taken by the AI, the AI 
produces key inputs for the decision makers that are 
by nature undisputable. The functional simplification 
and closure and the algorithmic interdepended create 
assemblages that are very difficult if not impossible to 
untangle [56]. 
Therefore, when it comes to accountability, we 
posit that to fully understand who is accountable for 
decisions that rely on inputs generated by AI systems, 
we have to consider the whole assemblage, where 
responsibilities are shared by the technology and by 
humans. Although valuables, contributions that 
underline that human agents should take full 
responsibility for the machines [59: pp. 19-20] do not 
capture the profound transformative power that AI 
holds and deploys whenever adopted in a decision-
making process, even if only to assist the decision 
makers. Responsibility is not exclusive: it is shared, 
precisely because of the nature of assemblages created 
by the adoption of technology. The structuration of 
assemblages blurs the boundaries of accountability, 
because the negotiation between existing regimes 
reshapes the decision-making process: technology and 
humans activities intertwin in a new entanglement that 
has to be adequately accounted. Accordingly, it is 
necessary to evaluate the entire process with all the 
inputs that might come from technology and humans, 
and make the new process accountable as a whole.  
With respect to the second point – the fact that 
public sources often deny the access to algorithms 
details – we do not neglect the relevance of property 
rights and patents. However, if the public sector 
decides to rely on private firms’ consultancy to 
elaborate algorithms which might serve in public 
sector decision-making, we do believe that the public 
sector has additional duties of accountability to the 
citizens. On this point, some scholars have advanced 
possible solutions in order to provide the best possible 
transparency without releasing algorithms’ details [51, 
26]. Although valuable, these contributions do not 
completely capture the profound transformations that 
AI produces in the decision-making process. Through 
this paper, we have investigated cases where the 
outcome of the AI supported decision-making had a 
severe impact on citizens’ life. Given the increasing 
relevance of the AI impact on public service provision, 
there is a need for a better understanding of the 
consequences of AI adoption to inform public sector 
decision-making processes. To this purpose, and 
following many public bodies and institutions already 
claiming for it [46, 59], we believe that opening the 
algorithm, and exposing to the public scrutiny the 
Page 2304
steps of the decision-making AI supports will be a 
substantial action towards a better accountability. The 
light shall be directed on the accountability of the 
assemblage constituted by technological, institutional 
and legal dimension and not independently on each 
dimension. 
10. Conclusions  
AI in public sector organizations is often deployed 
to achieve the objectives of rationalization and 
efficiency. However, given the increasing diffusion of 
AI tools, public managers should better consider the 
multidimensional impact of AI on the normative and 
legal frameworks which underpin public 
administration decision-making processes. Through 
this research, we shed light on the impact of AI on the 
decision-making processes in the public sector. The 
cases of UKVI and State v Loomis offer interesting 
insights on the impacts of the adoption of AI on the 
accountability of public sector organizations decision-
making. AI functionally simplifies and closes 
administrative processes. As a consequence, AI has 
impacts that transform the logic underlining the 
decision-making processes. The cases show that AI 
profiles in a way which is quite different from what is 
prescribed by legal and normative frameworks. Hence, 
AI can produce outcomes which do not reflect relevant 
factual circumstances. When these outcomes are used 
as inputs to support public sector decision-making, 
issues of accountability arise. As the examples show, 
institutions denied allegations of discriminations 
regarding the algorithms. At the same time, a request 
for further disclosure of algorithms’ details has been 
turned down. Algorithms can be seen as powerful 
carrier of modernization in public organizations: 
however, their capacity to create value has to be 
closely scrutinized. To this purpose, the research 
reveals that unpacking how algorithms work is needed 
to adequately understand the impact AI has on the 
accountability of public sector decision-making. 
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